Carlos Tingley holds an MA in Global Affairs and Politics from the University of Derby and a BA in Political Science from the University of British Columbia. His work focuses on housing policy, inequality, and the social impacts of net zero transitions, with particular interest in the private rented sector and local housing governance.
Improving the energy efficiency of England’s housing stock is essential if the UK is to meet its net zero commitments. In the private rented sector, however, the transition raises a more difficult question than is sometimes acknowledged: if homes are upgraded, who ultimately pays?
That question matters because the private rented sector is already one of the most pressured parts of the housing system. Tenants typically have little control over decisions about repairs, improvements, or retrofit, yet they may still bear the consequences if landlords respond by increasing rents. At the same time, the expected benefits of energy efficiency improvements are not always straightforward in practice. A better EPC rating does not automatically mean a tenant will experience lower bills or a more affordable home.
At present, energy efficiency policy in the private rented sector is heavily shaped by EPCs and Minimum Energy Efficiency Standards. The direction of travel is clear: government wants to improve the energy performance of rented homes and has continued to consult on stronger standards for the sector. But there is a gap here between regulatory ambition and lived outcome. EPC ratings are based on modelled performance and do not always correspond neatly to the actual energy use or affordability experience of households. In other words, a better rating does not necessarily translate into lower bills or greater housing security in practice.
This is where the fairness issue becomes more acute. In tighter local markets, there is a real possibility that some retrofit costs, or the perceived value of an improved property, are passed on through higher rents. Energy efficiency improvements can become part of a property’s market value, creating what some researchers describe as a green premium. That may make sense from an investment perspective, but it raises uncomfortable questions for tenants who are already stretched by rising housing costs.
The problem, then, is not retrofit itself. Warmer, more efficient homes are badly needed. The problem is a policy model that assumes technical improvement will automatically produce socially just outcomes. In the private rented sector, it may not. The familiar landlord-tenant split incentive remains important: landlords pay for improvements, while tenants are expected to benefit from lower energy bills. But where market conditions allow, landlords may also seek to recover costs through higher rents, particularly where public subsidy is limited.
This is one reason local government matters so much. National policy often depends on councils to enforce standards, identify poor-quality stock, coordinate delivery, and support tenants through change. Yet local authorities are expected to do this with uneven resources and uneven institutional capacity. The role of local government in net zero delivery is therefore central, but so too are the constraints under which it operates. Any serious attempt to decarbonise the private rented sector has to take those implementation realities much more seriously.
Nottingham offers a useful example of what is at stake. The city has a large private rented sector, rising rents, significant fuel poverty pressures, and an established licensing and retrofit landscape. That combination creates both opportunity and risk. On the one hand, the infrastructure for better enforcement and delivery is stronger than in many places. On the other, affordability pressures mean there is a real danger that the costs of transition could be felt most sharply by tenants with the least room to absorb them.
So what follows from this?
First, policy debate needs to move beyond the assumption that raising standards is enough on its own. The key issue is not just whether landlords comply, but whether the benefits of compliance are shared fairly.
Second, where retrofit is supported by public funding or council-backed schemes, there is a strong case for affordability safeguards to be built into delivery. If public money helps improve a property, it is reasonable to ask whether tenants should be protected from absorbing the cost through rapid rent increases.
Third, local enforcement and delivery need to be treated as part of the net zero challenge, not as an afterthought. Licensing, property intelligence, tenant advice, MEES compliance, and retrofit support are too often discussed separately. In practice, they are closely connected. More joined-up local pathways could help councils identify risk earlier and target support more effectively.
Net zero housing policy is often framed as a technical transition. In the private rented sector, it is also a social one. Who carries the upfront cost, who captures the benefits, and who bears the risk if things go wrong are not secondary questions. They are central to whether the transition is seen as fair and legitimate.
If the decarbonisation of rented housing is to succeed, policy needs to do more than improve buildings. It also needs to protect the people living in them.
